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Abstract—In this work, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
for vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) is proposed and
evaluated. The IDS is evaluated by simulation in presence of
rogue nodes that can launch different attacks. The proposed IDS
is capable of detecting a false information attack using statistical
techniques effectively and can also detect other types of attacks.
First, the theory and implementation of the VANET model that is
used to train the IDS is discussed. Then an extensive simulation
and analysis of our model under different traffic conditions is
conducted to identify the effects of these parameters in VANETs.
In addition, the extensive data gathered in the simulations is
presented using graphical and statistical techniques. Moreover,
rogue nodes are introduced in the network and an algorithm is
presented to detect these rogue nodes. Finally, we evaluate our
system and observe that the proposed application layer IDS based
on cooperative information exchange mechanism is better for
dynamic and fast moving networks such as VANETs as compared
to other techniques available.
Index Terms - Intrusion Detection, Security, wireless net-
works, cryptography, rogue nodes, fault tolerance, VANETs,
vehicular networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
VANETs are considered to be the next big thing that will
change our lives remarkably. It is only logical that technology
is used to make our lives and roads safer. The automotive
industry looks all set to equip their vehicles with Wireless
Access Vehicular Environment (WAVE) devices from 2015,
this will enable vehicles to communicate with each other to
exchange safety information. Moreover, autonomous vehicles
are not that far off either with Google Car a reality today.
These technological innovations in our vehicles will change
the way we think about road travel by making it much safer
and productive. WAVE protocols are based on IEEE 802.11p
standard and provide the basic radio standard for Dedicated
Short Range Communication (DSRC) in VANETs. Vehicles
use DSRC to communicate with each other i.e. vehicle to
vehicle (V2V) and with the infrastructure (Road Side Units
- RSUs) i.e. vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) communication.
VANETs will become a reality in the very near future.
Copyright (c) 2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted.
However, permission to use this material for any other purposes must be
obtained from the IEEE by sending a request to pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
Kamran Zaidi, Milos Milojevic, Veselin Rakocevic and Muttukrishnan
Rajarajan are all with School of Mathematics, Computer Science
and Engineering, City University London, London, EC1V 0HB,
UK. (Emails: (kamran.zaidi.1, milos.milojevic.1, veselin.rakocevic.1,
r.muttukrishnan)@city.ac.uk)
Arumugam Nallanathan is with Department of Informatics
at King’s College London, London, WC2R 2LS, UK. (Email:
arumugam.nallanathan@kcl.ac.uk)
The tremendous safety, convenience and commercial potential
of vehicular networks will not only drive its deployment but
will be fuelled by its demand as well once consumers realize
its effectiveness. VANETs have the ability to make roads
safer especially in conditions which are currently considered
hazardous and unavoidable. Imagine the ability to be able to
navigate safely in otherwise very dangerous driving conditions
like fog, accidents, black ice. However, there are some very
serious security issues that need to be addressed before the
full potential of VANETs can be realized. Vehicular networks
are very fast moving and highly dynamic due to which it is
very important that the information being shared is authentic
and actionable. As encounters will be short lived and the
received information has to be actioned quickly, therefore, it is
important that the reliability of the information is ascertained
quickly.
In ad-hoc networks, maintaining and depending on trust
or reputation is very expensive and a complex concept. In
VANETs, centralized trust has long been debated as it is
difficult to maintain, update and use. The existing mechanism
for authenticating messages in vehicular networks involves the
use of cryptography [7]–[9] and trust [18]–[20]. Cryptographic
techniques involve paired keys and overhead in terms of
computing cost, storage and time. Even with cryptographic
techniques, security lapses are inevitable leading to intrusions
due to stolen keys or compromised Trusted Authorities etc.
An attack is especially difficult to prevent when it is launched
from within the network. Due to the wireless and mobile
nature of vehicular networks and its dynamic topology, it is
not possible to use the same intrusion detection mechanisms
that are used in wired networks. Therefore, it is essential that
an intrusion detection system is deployed to detect attacks and
help secure VANETs. The proposed IDS will detect different
types of attacks launched by rogue or compromised nodes
in the network. The IDS will then be able to minimize the
damage to the network by taking necessary actions. The
proposed IDS works in a distributed manner and is designed
for deployment at each host node in the vehicular network.
A. Our Contributions
The main contributions in this paper are:
1) An Intrusion Detection System is proposed that uses
statistical techniques to detect anomalies and identify
rogue nodes using a traffic model. We extend the earlier
work done in [23] significantly by extensive simulations
under varying vehicular and network traffic conditions
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especially in emergency messages.
2) The extensive data collected is analysed using statistical
techniques and the decision to accept or reject data is
based on hypothesis testing.
3) The effects of various parameters such as transmission
intervals and vehicle density are also shown.
4) The proposed IDS is not dependent on any infrastructure
such as RSU or expensive hardware such as Lidar, radar
or cameras.
5) Using the proposed mechanism the network message
congestion is controlled by reduced message transmis-
sions i.e. prevents broadcast storms. Moreover, we show
that using the proposed model and IDS it is possible
for vehicles to keep the network functioning even when
up to 40% nodes are malicious and contribute false
parameter values.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: related work
is discussed in Section II. The system and the attack model
is presented in Section III. In Section IV, overview of the
proposed IDS is presented. Section V evaluates the security
performance of the proposed IDS in detail. The results are
discussed in Section VI and the conclusions and future work
are given in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Security of VANETs is a very important issue and has been
the focus of research for the last many years. The vehicular
networks are unique as the users will be making life saving
decisions based on the information being received. It is
therefore, imperative that there is a mechanism to detect false
information. Researchers have proposed using Cryptography
and digital signatures to secure and sign messages so as to
ensure integrity and non-repudiation of messages in VANETs.
Digital signatures have been proposed for VANETs in [4]–[6].
Different schemes have been proposed including Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) [7]–[9].
The propagation of emergency messages in VANETs is
done either through multi-hop or by broadcasting them.
Therefore, malicious behaviour e.g. false information attack
is possible even in case of strong cryptography as insiders
can turn malicious. A malicious user might send false alert to
clear the road for himself or cause havoc by creating a traffic
jam by sending a fake accident alert. Researchers in [13]
suggest using data centric techniques to make VANETs more
reliable by only considering the data being shared. For fast
moving and dynamic networks information centric schemes
are required in addition to the cryptography and certificates
to protect against inside attacks.
There are mainly two approaches for dealing with the false
information attacks i.e. Trust or Reputation based schemes
and Data Centric Schemes. This trust based on reputation
can either be infrastructure based or self organising [17].
Self organising trust means to assign a trust score to another
user based on previous or current interactions. This trust
score represents the reputation of the user in the network and
helps other nodes decide whether it can be trusted or not.
Such voting schemes (credit scores) are promising in wired
networks or online systems where the users have a fixed
physical identity but difficult to implement in a fast moving
and rapidly changing network such as VANETs. Reputation
based schemes have been proposed in [18]–[20]. In [19],
[20] a decentralized infrastructure has been adopted whereas
in [18] a centralized infrastructure is proposed. Reputation
and Trust based schemes are useful but cannot be used for
detecting false emergency messages as trust is built over a
period of time and if a false message comes from a trusted
node then there is no way to detect it.
Data centric misbehaviour detection techniques have been
proposed in [15], [18]. In [18] the authors propose a model
of VANETs to be used to detect and correct errors in the data
being sent out by vehicles. The messages that conform to the
model are accepted and rejected otherwise. In [15] emergency
messages are relayed and false information is identified based
on the kind of message and the subsequent behaviour of the
sending vehicle. Such a technique will not be feasible for
emergency messages which need to be acted on quickly. Also,
such a scheme will increase the computation cost for the
nodes. A misbehaviour detection system and eviction mecha-
nism is proposed in [16] where nodes are termed misbehaving
if their info is inconsistent with the situation. Once a node
is classified as misbehaving node then the neighbouring nodes
can temporarily evict them by sharing warning messages about
them and later their credentials are passed on to the CA
which revokes them by adding them to a Revocation List
(RL). However, as discussed previously the RLs are difficult
to manage and use in VANETs.
Intrusion detection is the most reliable approach to protect
vehicular networks against threats as it has the ability to detect
insider and external attacks with a high accuracy [2]. Some
research has been done in the area of IDS / IPS for Mobile
Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) and VANETs in [1], [24]–[30].
In [26], the authors propose an acknowledgement scheme
to prevent packet dropping and false misbehaviour report
generation by nodes for MANETs to report or convict a rogue
node. In [27], the authors propose a watchdog for intrusion
detection in VANETs. The watchdog works by monitoring all
packets to decide if an attack is under progress. In [25], trust
and position information is combined to determine if a vehicle
is falsifying its position i.e. if the position claimed by one
vehicle overlaps the position claimed by another in which case
the vehicle with low trust value is flagged as an intruder. In
[24], a method is proposed to detect intrusions through trust
by assigning reputation scores to vehicles and the RSUs are
used to compute these scores and the CA aggregates them.
Similarly, in [1], rule based anomaly detection and reputation
scores are used for the IDS in vehicular network. In [28], [29],
intrusion prediction approaches have been discussed.
Intrusion detection systems are very effective as they are
able to detect attacks from insiders at real time but at the
same time need to be updated for new attacks. Moreover, IDS
need strong authentication and identification systems in order
to work properly. Intrusion prediction systems on the other
hand try to predict new attacks that can protect the system
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from unknown attacks. However, the probability thresholds
need to be set carefully in such intrusion prediction systems to
get accurate results. This work proposes an IDS that does not
use trust or reputation and only relies on the analysis of the
received data to detect intrusions in the network. The statistical
technique used in the IDS declares data true or false which
leads to the node being declared honest or rogue instead of
the other way around.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Authentication & Privacy Preservation
In any network, it is very important that nodes can be
identified correctly and are distinguishable from one another
but at the same time privacy is preserved. This means that
all nodes are authenticated by a Certificate Authority (CA).
It is assumed that all vehicles have authenticated themselves
with a certificate authority and obtained a valid certificate and
public/private key pairs (Pseudonyms-PNs). The keys are used
to encrypt the routine messages and others can authenticate
and decrypt the messages by using the relevant public keys.
It is also assumed that all vehicles have enough key pairs to
last them a long time and they keep changing these keys to
preserve their privacy. However, these keys are in a reasonable
time i.e. not too quickly to avoid short term linkability. This
ensures that even by changing PNs the recent messages of a
node can be linked to the same node. Therefore, the proposed
IDS allows the nodes to change their PNs but can still keep
track of the rogue nodes.
B. VANET Model
In order to model the flow of traffic on motorways /
highways a mathematical model is needed. Therefore, the
Greenshield’s model which is considered to be a fairly accurate
model in traffic engineering for estimating and modelling
uninterrupted traffic (without traffic signals) is utilized. Green-
shield’s model uses standard parameters such as flow (vehicles
per hour) and density (vehicles per km). The model describes
the relationship between speed (v) and density (k) of vehicles
as being negatively correlated with density increasing with
the decrease in speed as shown in Fig 1(c). In the figure vf
is the free flow speed when density is zero i.e. vehicles can
choose to move freely as there are no or very few vehicles
on the road. As the density of vehicles increases the speed
decreases till density reaches the maximum which is referred
to as jam density or kj at which point the speed becomes zero
and vehicles are stuck in a traffic jam. In the figure km and vm
are the optimal density and speed respectively which allows
the traffic to progress at the optimum rate of flow - qm Fig 1
(a), (b) & (c). The flow is given as:
q = k × v (1)
The relationship between speed and density is given as:
v = vf − k
kj
vf (2)
From (1) & (2) the relationship between speed and density
can be found to be:
q = vfk − k
2
kj
vf (3)
Each vehicle can calculate the density of vehicles on the
highway around it by the number of messages it receives
from other vehicles by checking their IDs from messages. This
enables each vehicle to calculate the density quite accurately in
a moving window around itself as shown in Fig 2. The size of
this density window is equal to the transmission and reception
range of a vehicle (500 meters). This means that a vehicle
can receive messages from a vehicle which is up to 500m
ahead of it and 500m behind it. Therefore, each vehicle has
a communication window of 1000m around it that it can use
to calculate the density (Densitycalc). Also, each vehicle can
calculate the average speed of vehicles (SpeedAVG) within its
communication window. In our scheme each vehicle transmits
not only its location and speed but the calculated value of
flow as well. Therefore, the vehicles calculate the traffic flow
parameter using density and average speed of other vehicles
through Greenshields model. The flow serves as a global
parameter which each vehicle calculates on its own and should
be very similar for vehicles that are close to each other in
the same traffic conditions. Moreover, information will be
4considered correct if it conforms to this model and false
otherwise.
The idea behind this mechanism is that in case of an
emergency (an accident or sudden braking) all vehicles behind
the incident will apply brakes and therefore, their flow values
will go down. These low values of flow will be transmitted to
other vehicles behind them which will cause their calculated
flow values to go down as well as shown in Fig. 2. The red
region is where the brakes have been applied, the orange
region is where the effect information is being propagated
and they are getting information of an accident up ahead. The
blue region is some distance away where vehicles are getting
reports of some congestion ahead on the highway but they
don’t have to start braking just yet. This is one of the benefits
and desirable effects of the proposed model, as there is no need
to flood the network with the congestion warning and instead
the information is propagated gracefully. However, in case of
a false emergency message; a vehicle will try to create the
illusion of an accident by lowering its flow and speed values
and transmitting it to others. However, as there is only one
vehicle that is transmitting this low value, it can easily be
flagged and identified.
Each vehicle transmits its FlowAVG which becomes
FlowRcvd for other vehicles. If a vehicle receives a value of
Flow from another vehicle that does not agree with the VANET
model then the data is rejected and vehicles’ ID is noted and
reported. If the data agrees with the model then the receiving
node checks the data with its own calculated values to confirm
its values are indeed correct. If the values do not agree with the
node’s own calculated parameters of Flow, Speed and Density
then the values are discarded and the sender ID is reported.
The two values of flow are calculated as follows:
FlowOWN = SpeedAVG ×Densitycalc (4)
FlowAVG =
1
n
n∑
FlowRcvd (5)
C. Message Format
Each vehicle creates its own message m for beacon and
apart from the usual parameters also includes the following:
m(Speedown, Densitycalc, F lowAVG)
Each beacon message m is hashed (H(m)) and signed by the
vehicle using its secret key (SK).
sig = SK(H(m))
The details of how this signature is generated and how they are
verified are not in the scope of this paper. In case of emergency
e.g. an accident or emergency braking, each vehicle generates
an emergency message which has the following format:
EmergencyMsg(Type, F lowAVG, SpeedOwn, Densitycalc)
where field - Type can be Emergency Braking, Accident
Ahead, Slippery Road etc. It must be noted that the emergency
messages are not encrypted and have to be actioned quickly
by those receiving it.
Fig. 2: Decreasing value of Flow in case of accident
D. Attack Model
There are different types of attacks that can take place in
VANETs. We will be looking at the following attacks:
1) False Information Attack: A rogue node can inject false
data in the network either on purpose with malicious
intent or due to faulty sensors that can cause serious
damage to the network. Under extreme conditions the
network can even be paralysed. The rogue node can start
injecting false data at any time and can falsify values of
their own speed and their calculated values of flow and
density either in beacon message or emergency message.
In case of a false emergency message the rogue node will
start sending a low value of Flow or sudden decrease
in speed or both to indicate an accident or emergency
braking.
2) Sybil Attack: Another attack that a rogue node can
launch is a Sybil attack i.e. when a rogue vehicle
transmits multiple messages each with a different ID
to indicate that it is not one vehicle but many vehicles
thereby giving a false impression of congestion by
lowering the Flow values in the messages. The IDs could
either have been spoofed or stolen from compromised
nodes.
IV. IDS OVERVIEW
The host based Intrusion Detection System proposed in
this work is deployed at each vehicle and is able to detect
intrusions in VANETs and then take corrective measures to
contain the damage. In order to train the IDS, a model of the
network under normal conditions is needed so that deviations
(anomalies) from the normal behaviour can be detected and
alarms can be raised i.e. other vehicles can be informed (shown
in Fig. 3). In the proposed model discussed in the previous
section, the vehicles send their speed, calculated average flow,
calculated density and location information to other vehicles.
Also, each vehicle calculates its own value of average flow
which provides them with a very good estimate of the traffic
in their vicinity and up ahead as well.
A. Cooperative Data Collection
Using our scheme each node (vehicle) collects data from
other nodes (vehicles) in its vicinity to model the traffic around
it. The vehicles cooperate with each other and share the values
of their parameters using the Greenshield’s model described
above. As a vehicle will receive the parameter values from
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all other vehicles within range, therefore, each vehicle has
information about all the vehicles in that region. Due to this
each vehicle can calculate the (estimate) mean µ. The trace
data has shown that under all conditions the flow values will
be close together and will lie within two standard deviations
of the mean. This means that all vehicles that are within
communication range are calculating very similar value of the
FlowAVG as they are under similar traffic conditions. This is
obvious as all nodes are dependent on other nodes to calculate
their parameter values in all circumstances i.e. free flowing
traffic and in case of an accident. When enough readings /
data has been gathered, the conditions of the central limit
theorem apply and we approach a normal distribution. To show
this we plot the frequency distribution of the Average Flow
Values FlowAVG of a random node e.g. Node No. 90 in our
simulation with vehicle inter-arrival time of 2 sec, transmission
interval of 0.5 sec from simulation time t=203 sec to t=325 sec
as shown in Fig 4. The data is slightly left skewed as vehicles
start from rest and therefore, have lower values of flow in
the beginning. This means that we are now in a position to
set up a hypothesis test and use the t-test for detecting false
values reported by a rogue / malicious vehicle. The t-test for
comparing the two population means is used as the sample
size can be small.
The parameter values follow a normal distribution and as the
received values are in pairs, therefore, we use the paired t-test
to calculate the probabilities associated with getting values in
different ranges. The standard deviation and the test statistic
to are calculated as:
to =
x¯− y¯√
s2x
n1
+
s2y
n2
(6)
Here, x¯ is the mean difference of the received values and y¯
is the mean difference of vehicle’s own calculated values, sx
and sy are the standard deviations of received and vehicles
own calculated values respectively. n1 and n2 are the number
of samples for the received and own values respectively. The
degrees of freedom will be n1 + n2 − 2. The algorithm
of the proposed IDS is given in Algorithm. 1, the data is
collected from all neighbouring nodes and checked if there
is a significant difference between the calculated and received
values. If there is a significant difference then the node is
monitored and some parameter values are collected (accepted)
initially. Once sufficient samples have been collected then the
t-test is carried out. If the t-test gives a result within the
acceptance region then the data is accepted and else rejected.
If the data is rejected then the node is highlighted as rogue and
the attack is classified as Information Attack and subsequent
values from that node are rejected. A message is then sent to
other users informing them of the rogue node and the type of
attack being launched by that node.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for IDS
for each msg received do
Update Densitycalc
Update SpeedAVG
FlowOWN = SpeedAVG x Desnsitycalc
if FlowRcvd − FlowOWN < Threshold then
Accept Data
Calculate FlowAVG
else
Monitor Node and Accept Data temporarily
if Hypothesis Test == Reject then
Reject Data
Report Node
Calculate FlowAVG
end if
end if
end for
B. Hypothesis Testing for Data Correctness
Hypothesis testing is a common technique used in engineer-
ing applications to test two claims when only one of them
can be true. The hypothesis testing approach also assigns
a confidence interval to a range of values that enables us
to accept a claim with a certain confidence. This suits us
as in our VANET model and proposed IDS there are two
possibilities i.e. either the node is honest and we accept its
data or the node is rogue and we reject its data. To check
whether hypothesis testing works well in our model, we ran the
simulations numerous times in OMNET++ and then exported
the data to MS Excel and Matlab to analyse and visualize it.
We use hypothesis testing to decide whether a received
parameter value should be accepted or not. If the received
value is within the 99% confidence interval i.e. within the
Fig. 4: FlowAVG values for Node 90 between t=203 sec to
t=325 sec
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acceptance region, then the value is accepted. If the received
flow value is within the rejection region then it is rejected.
This is shown in Fig 5. There are always two hypotheses
stated, there is the null hypothesis Ho which we want to test
(and assumed to be correct) and alternate hypothesis Ha. If
the null hypothesis is rejected then the alternate hypothesis
is accepted and if we do not have enough evidence against
the null hypothesis then it is accepted. The null hypothesis
Ho in our case is that the data (Flow value) received is from
an honest node. The alternate hypothesis Ha is that the value
received is false (from a rogue node) and we fail to accept
(reject) it. In other words we say that we don’t have enough
evidence to accept the received data and therefore, we reject
it. The Hypotheses that will be tested in the host IDSs are
stated below:
Ho : Accept Received data (Node is Honest)
Ha : Reject (Fail to Accept) Received data (Data is false &
Node is Malicious or Rogue)
The IDS in each vehicle also computes a p-value that helps
it in accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis. The p-value
gives the probability of getting a value which is atleast as
extreme so, the p-value gives information about the weight of
evidence against the null hypothesis Ho i.e. the smaller the p-
value the greater the evidence against Ho. There are two types
of errors associated with hypothesis testing as shown in Table
I. In our scenario, Type-2 error (false negative) is not very
serious as the worst case scenario is slowing down whereas
Type-1 error (false positive) is very serious. Therefore, keeping
this in view we use a wide confidence interval. The level of
significance is denoted by α. The usual values of α are taken
to be 0.01(1%) or 0.05(5%) which means the probability that
the test statistic falls in our acceptance region is 1−α and the
confidence interval for the two values of α = 0.01 and 0.05 are
99% and 95% respectively. We take the value of α to be 0.01
and as this will be a two-tailed test therefore, the upper and
lower limit of our acceptance region will be tα/2 & −tα/2 as
shown in Fig. 5. The degrees of freedom will be n1 + n2 − 2
TABLE I: Decisions in Hypothesis Testing
Node is Honest - Ho Node is Rogue - Ha
Accept Ho No Error Type 2 Error
Reject Ho Type 1 Error No Error
TABLE II: SIMULATION PARAMETERS
PARAMETER VALUE
Simulation Time 400 sec
Scenario 3 Lane Highway
Highway Length 5-Kms
Max Vehicle Speed 28 m/sec or 100 Km/hr
Mobility Tool VACaMobil
Network Simulation Package OMNET++
Vehicular Traffic Generation Tool SUMO
Vehicle Inter-Arrival Rate 1s, 2s and 3s
Transmission Rate Every 0.2s, 0.5s and 1s
Wireless Protocol 802.11p
Transmission Range 500m in each direction
and the corresponding limits can be looked up from the t-table.
This means that the probability is α that the test statistic to
falls in the region to > tα/2 or to < −tα/2 when the null
hypothesis Ho is true. Therefore, we will reject the received
value if it is outside the acceptance region i.e. we reject the
value if either:
−tα/2 > to > tα/2
In our case the received flow values for any chosen node
are always within the acceptance region or within the 99%
confidence interval as long as the node is honest. In the case of
an accident as the values will drop, they will have an impact on
all vehicles in the region which will bring down the FlowAVG
value for the region and as a result the values are still within
the acceptance region as the standard deviation increases.
As shown in Fig. 5, there are two cases where the rogue
node will falsify its values i.e. it can either deny congestion or
accident or it can wrongly give the impression of congestion
or accident. Therefore, the IDS can decide which category the
false information falls under depending on whether to > tα/2
or to < −tα/2.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup
In order to check the proposed IDS extensive simulations
were done using OMNET++, SUMO [22] and VACaMobil
[21]. OMNET is a modular C++ library and framework that
is used for network simulations. Simulation of Urban Mobility
(SUMO) is a software tool used to generate vehicular traffic
by specifying speed, types, behaviour and number of vehicles.
Sumo also sets up road types and conditions. VACaMobil is a
car mobility manager for OMNET that works in parallel with
SUMO.
The scenario is simulated with parameters shown in Table
II. In order to gather data for anomaly detection we use
different scenarios. We gather data when there is no accident
and no rogue nodes to understand and develop the model under
normal circumstances. Data is also collected for runs in case of
an actual accident to understand how parameters will change.
Furthermore, rogue nodes are inserted in both cases i.e. in case
of normal conditions (no-accident) and in case of an actual
accident to see how well our IDS works. The simulations are
carried out with varying values of the following parameters:
1) Density: The density of nodes is an important parameter
for ad-hoc networks and especially for VANETs. As
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Fig. 6: Accident Scenario: Inter-Arrival time = 1 sec: All Vehicles starting at approx t = 80sec
(a) Node 39, Update Interval 1sec (b) Node 40, Update Interval 0.5sec (c) Node 36, Update Interval 0.2sec
Fig. 7: Accident Scenario: Inter-Arrival time = 2 sec: All vehicles starting at approx t = 80sec
(a) Node 32, Update Interval 1sec (b) Node 26, Update Interval 0.5sec (c) Node 24, Update Interval 0.2sec
Fig. 8: Accident Scenario: Inter-Arrival time = 3 sec: All vehicles starting at approx t = 80sec
the channel bandwidth is limited, it is essential to keep
it under consideration and observe its effects on any
system. In this work, we vary the density of vehicles
by changing their inter-arrival time i.e. the time that
they are inserted in the simulation. We use OMNET’s
exponential inter-arrival distribution with a time of 1, 2
and 3 seconds.
2) Beaconing Rate or Sampling Rate: This is the beacon-
ing time period after which each vehicle is transmitting
its parameters to other vehicles. We have used variable
time periods to observe the effects of this on VANETs
in general and the proposed IDS in particular. We have
used time periods of 0.2, 0.5 and 1 seconds. It is
worth mentioning that the recommended beaconing rate
in IEEE 809.11p is a 100 milliseconds (0.1 sec). The
minimum time period of 0.2 seconds was chosen as
the generated data set was becoming too large and data
processing was becoming a problem.
3) Number of Rogue Nodes: The number of rogue nodes
is varied to evaluate the performance of the proposed
scheme and the IDS in these circumstances.
A large amount of trace data is generated with the simula-
tion runs by varying parameters described above. For example,
the most data generated in this work in one simulation is if the
8sampling rate is 0.2 sec, the total number of vehicles which
are active in simulation in case of an accident, are 300 and
the simulation time is 400 seconds then more than 18000 data
points are generated and collected out of which around 10,000
are vectors. The minimum data generated in one simulation is
when the sampling rate is 1 sec, the total number of vehicles
which are active in simulation in case of no accident are
around 150 and the simulation time is 400 seconds then around
10,000 data points are generated out of which around 6,000
are vectors. The parameters of interest from the large data set
were exported to MS Excel and Matlab for analysis, testing
and visualization.
B. Simulation Results
1) Actual Accident Scenario - No Rogue Nodes: The
results for the actual accident scenario are shown in Figs. 6,
7 & 8. The density of vehicles (controlled by Inter-Arrival
Time) and the update interval (transmission rate) are varied
in the simulations to study their effects. What is noteworthy
here is that the flow parameter gradually decreases which
proves our earlier assumption.
In Fig. 6 (a), (b) & (c) the results are shown for the value
of FlowAVG for vehicles that are starting at approximately
t=80 sec and an accident occurs at t=180 secs for the same
density of vehicles. Similarly, Figs. 7 & 8 show the results
when the density is kept constant and the update interval is
varied. It can be seen from Figs. 6, 7 & 8 that the density
has a negligible effect on the working of the method i.e.
all vehicles receive the information about the attack at the
same time (i.e. Figs in the same column such as 6b, 7b,
8b) if the update interval is the same. This shows that the
proposed mechanism is scalable. Also, it is clear that the
update interval has a significant impact on the information
flow as the value settles down the quickest in Figs 6c, 7c,
8c) when the update interval is the smallest i.e. 0.2 sec as
compared to the others when the update interval is higher.
However, this is acceptable as the standard update interval in
VANETs can be as low as 100 msec or 0.1 sec.
2) Normal Traffic - No Accident - No Rogue Nodes:
In order to record the traffic data in case of normal traffic
i.e. no accident and no rogue nodes to see how the system
works. Fig. 9 shows the recorded data for the 100th node
when update interval is 1sec and inter-arrival rate is 1 sec. As
expected, the average value of Flow (FlowAVG), calculated
values for flow (FlowOWN ) & the received flow values from
other vehicles (FlowRCVD) are all quite close to each other
and the received values (FlowRCVD) are in fact within one
standard deviation of the (FlowAVG) as calculated by the
node.
3) No Accident - Rogue Nodes: A scenario is simulated in
which there is no accident but rogue nodes start transmitting
a low false value of Flow after t=160 sec. We run the
simulations both with and without the proposed IDS and also
vary the number of rogue / malicious nodes and collect the
data. The results are shown with and without the proposed
Fig. 9: Distribution of FlowAVG, FlowOWN & FlowRCVD
in case of Normal Traffic / No-Accident and all Honest Nodes
IDS in Fig. 10, when there are 20% rogue nodes. As shown
in Figs. 10b the flow value goes down at first while the IDS
runs the hypothesis tests to evaluate the received data and
then starts to reject the false values. However, in the absence
of the IDS (Fig. 10a) the Flow value is reduced as all the
values are accepted.
4) Accident Scenario - Rogue Nodes: An accident scenario
is simulated where rogue nodes start transmitting false (high)
values after t=230 sec after an accident has occurred to deny
the accident. The simulation is run both with and without the
IDS and the results are shown in Fig. 11 (a) & (b) respectively.
It can be seen in Fig. 11 (b) that the very high values by rogue
nodes are being rejected by the IDS.
C. Evaluation Metrics
We test our IDS by computing the True Positive (TP) rate
(detection rate), the false positive rate and the detection time.
The number of rogue nodes was increased from 5% to 40% to
test how successfully the proposed IDS classifies rogue nodes
as rogue and honest nodes as honest. We also compare our
results with that of two previous schemes that deal with false
information attacks i.e. [15] and [24]. The metrics used are
described below:
1. True Positive (TP): This is the detection rate of rogue
nodes (RNs) i.e. what percentage of rogue nodes is detected
and classified as rogue nodes. This is also referred to as
sensitivity and is calculated as:
TP =
No. of RNs detected correctly
Total No. of RNs
(7)
2. False Positive (FP): This is the percentage of honest nodes
(HNs) incorrectly classified as rogue nodes. Specificity is
defined as the number of honest nodes correctly identified and
given as:
Specificity =
No. of HNs identified correctly
Total No. of HNs
(8)
9(a) FlowAVG Without IDS (b) FlowAVG WITH IDS
Fig. 10: No Accident Scenario: 20% Rogue Nodes - start transmitting false values at t=160sec
(a) FlowAVG Without IDS (b) FlowAVG WITH IDS
Fig. 11: Accident Scenario: 20% Rogue Nodes - start transmitting false values at t=230sec
and the false positives are calculated as:
FP = 1− Specificity (9)
3. Overhead: The overhead is the cost incurred due to the
IDS working and the extra data that is exchanged with other
vehicles. It is an important metric as it is a measure of the
efficiency of any scheme.
D. Effectiveness of Hypothesis Testing
The adoption of hypothesis testing works very well to
determine whether the received data is correct or not. The t-test
works very well to determine whether the data is false or not
and thereby concluding that the node is rogue or honest. The t-
test is comparing the population means of two populations and
ascertaining if the means of the two populations are increasing
or decreasing together. The simulation confirms that when the
nodes are honest then the vehicles that are close together will
have very similar Flow values (Fig. 9). This is true in all cases
i.e. both in case of accident and free flowing traffic.
The cases simulated in this work are the worst case scenar-
ios i.e. coordinated attacks by rogue nodes. This means that
all rogue nodes work together and launch the attack at the
same time to cause maximum damage. Such a coordinated
attack is not only difficult to launch but also very expensive
as it requires rogue vehicles to be placed together in strategic
positions.
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(a) Detection Rate Comparison in case of False Information Attack
(b) False Positive Rate Comparison in case of False Information
Attack
(c) Overhead Comparison in case of False Information Attack
Fig. 12: Comparison of Proposed IDS: a)Detection Rate, (b) False Positive Rate, (c) Overhead
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss the performance of the proposed
intrusion detection mechanism on the network, its reliability
and robustness under changing parameters. We also compare
the work to previously proposed approaches.
A. False Information Attack Detection
The proposed IDS is able to detect false information attacks
very effectively by only analysing the data without taking
into account any Trust or Reputation scores. The proposed
mechanism is compared with two schemes i.e. DCMD [15]
and ELIDV [24]. The detection rates are shown in Fig. 12a
and false positive rates are compared in Fig. 12b. The detection
rate (True Positives) of the proposed scheme is better than
DCMD and ELIDV upto 30% rogue nodes and almost the
same as ELIDV after that till 40%. The false positive rate of
the proposed scheme is better than DCMD and ELIDV upto
20% rogue nodes but increases slightly above ELIDV at 40%.
B. Resilience to Sybil Attacks
In a Sybil attack, an attacker presents multiple identities
with an intent to either create the illusion of congestion or
accidents or deny their existence. So, a rogue vehicle will send
multiple messages in order to cause confusion in the network
by bringing the parameter value down. However, the proposed
IDS aggregates the parameter values, therefore, the IDS will
work very well and will be resilient to Sybil attacks as long
as the total number of Sybil identities are less than 40% of
the total identities (nodes) as shown in Fig. 12(a,b).
C. Overhead Comparison
The overhead of the proposed IDS is compared with the
schemes in [24] and [15] and result is shown in Fig. 12c. The
overhead in the proposed IDS is less as compared to DCMD
and ELIDV except when there are 40% nodes at which point it
is slightly higher than DCMD. The overhead in the proposed
IDS increases with the increase in number of rogue nodes as
the IDS starts to collect more past values to run the hypothesis
test. However, the proposed IDS does not need to keep past
parameter values as long as they agree with the calculated
values which is the reason why the initial overhead is low.
D. Quick Response of IDS
The analysis shows that the test can be successfully con-
ducted by taking only 7 samples from a rogue node i.e. the
node that is incorrectly transmitting a false value, and perform-
ing the t-test on the population mean of two populations. The
7 samples can be collected in a minimum of 0.7 seconds if the
beaconing rate is 100 ms. This means that the IDS enables the
nodes to quickly decide whether to accept or reject the data
received without generating a lot of overhead.
11
E. Countermeasures & Fault Tolerance
The proposed VANET model and exchange of parameters
give the vehicular network a built-in resilience to launch
countermeasures against false information attacks. The data
is highlighted as false or malicious if it does not conform
to the VANET model or if it fails the hypothesis test. The
countermeasures include rejecting the data of that node and
reporting the node as malicious. This was shown in Figs. 10b
& 11b where the values were too low or too high as compared
to the node’s own values and were detected (and then rejected)
by the IDS. The IDS is therefore, fault tolerant as it can work
in the presence of false information.
F. Effective Information Dissemination
The widely proposed method of propagating emergency
messages is by repeatedly broadcasting the message by vehi-
cles to others behind them. This can quickly cause a broadcast
storm in an already bandwidth limited channel. In the proposed
scheme there is no channel congestion as there is no need
for multi-hop retransmissions and the information is still
disseminated effectively.
G. Limitations of proposed IDS
The proposed IDS works extremely well when the differ-
ence between the received values and the calculated values is
high i.e. the values being received from the rogue nodes are
too high or too low. However, if the rogue nodes coordinate
and gradually decrease (or increase) their parameter values and
launch the attack over some time then it will be very difficult to
detect the attack. The reason is that the gradual decrease in the
parameter values will not be flagged as an anomaly and thus
never tested for correctness. However, as discussed previously
doing this defeats the main purpose of the rogue / malicious
vehicles i.e. to cause maximum damage or confusion in the
network.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work an intrusion detection system has been devel-
oped, tested and the results discussed. The results show that
the proposed IDS is scalable and has an excellent performance
when the number of rogue nodes is small. The performance
degrades when the number of rogue nodes increases but
still works reasonably well. The proposed model and IDS
demonstrate the effectiveness of the statistical technique used
to determine if the data is false based on the overall collected
data without using Trust or reputation scores. The IDS does
not depend on any infrastructure which is a major benefit as
compared to other schemes. The false data is much easier to
detect if it differs too greatly from the calculated data and
difficult to detect if it varies slightly. However, the target of
the rogue node is to drop or raise the value of its parameters
quickly to damage the network and raising or dropping it
gradually is not in its interest.
In the future, the work can be extended by modifying the
IDS to detect other types of attacks in VANETs such as Denial
of Service and false position reporting by rogue nodes in the
network or a stationary user outside the network. This can be
done by simulating the attacks using the developed platform
and then detecting them with the help of anomaly or rule-based
detection.
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